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CONFIDENTIAL ± NOT FOR PUBLIC ACCESS 
A Duty of Solidarity?: WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
Draft Articles and the right to offer assistance in disasters 
7KpUqVH2¶'RQQHOO	&UDLJ$OODQ 
1. Introduction 
There has long been an understanding, and indeed an expectation, that after a natural 
disaster humanitarian relief will emanate from international governmental and non-
governmental organisations and states, which stricken states will generally accept.1 The 
current International Law Commission (ILC) drafting project regarding the protection of 
persons in the event of disasters includes an article which refers to the right of external actors 
to offer assistance to disaster-stricken states. Draft article 16 states that: µIn responding to 
disasters, States, the United Nations, and other competent intergovernmental organizations 
have the right to offer assistance to the affected State. Relevant non-governmental 
organizations may also offer assistance to the affected State¶.2 
In his fourth report the Special Rapporteur on the protection of persons in the event of 
disasters, Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, noted that when a natural disaster strikes, evidence of 
                                                                    
 Reader in Law at the Law School, University of Strathclyde and Solicitor at Pinsent Masons, LLP, Glasgow, 
respectively. We are indebted to those who commented on earlier drafts. In particular we must thank Dr. Dug 
&XELHRI4XHHQ¶V8QLYHUVLW\%HOIDVW3URIHVVRU'LQR.ULWVLRWLVRI1RWWLQJKDP8QLYHUVLW\, and Professor 
Kenneth Norrie of Strathclyde University. All responsibility for errors resides with the authors. 
1 Indeed Article VII of the 2003 resolution of the Institut de Droit International on Humanitarian Assistance (2 
September 2003) (Bruges Resolution) prohibits µDUELWUDU\DQGXQMXVWLILDEOH¶UHMHFWLRQVRIJRRG-faith aid offers.  
6HHDOVR66LYDNXPDUDQµ$UELWUDU\:LWKROGLQJRI&RQVHQWWR+XPDQLWDULDQ$VVLVWDQFHLQ6LWXDWLRQVRI'LVDVWHU¶
(2015) 64 ICLQ 501; D Schindler, The right to humanitarian assistance: right and/or obligation, SHS-
95/CONF.805/6 ( UNESCO, 1995); R Hardcastle and A Chua, µHumanitarian Assistance: Towards a Right of 
$FFHVVWR9LFWLPVRI1DWXUDO'LVDVWHUV¶,55&-%HQWRQ+HDWKµ'LVDVWHUV5HOLHIDQG1HJOHFW
the Duty to Accept Humanitarian Assistance and the Work of the International Law &RPPLVVLRQ¶
JILP 419.  
2 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 2014) (ILC Draft Articles) art 16. 
international compassion is abundant.3 The manifestation of such humanitarian practices 
gives encouragement to those seeking to strengthen an international sense of inter-
dependence. However, tKHQRWLRQRIWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶ZKLOHLQWXLWLYHO\
attractive as an ideal, is meaningless without further elaboration,4 and its goals need to be 
instrumentalised. If a key value of the international community is the development of 
international solidarity then a natural disaster offers the perfect context for demonstrating this 
value. However, there is no guarantee of aid donation. Interestingly, following the 
devastating Nepalese back-to-back earthquakes of April/May 2015 United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) launched a flash appeal of $422 
million to support people through immediate lifesaving aid operations.5 As of early 
September 2015, only 57 per cent of the total appeal was covered. Further, the less high-
profile a disaster, the less assistance it receives. In 2010, the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan 
floods accounted for 96.56 per cent of all international humanitarian assistance in disasters, 
leaving 3.54 per cent for the other 54 major disasters occurring that year. A further 317 
reported disasters either did not receive funding or were not recorded on the UN Financial 
Tracking Service.6 
The ILC Draft Articles are motivated by a sense of solidarity and have a theme of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\7HUPVLQFOXGLQJµULJKW¶µREOLJDWLRQ¶ and µGXW\¶DSSHDUEXWWKHLU
SUHFLVHPHDQLQJVDUHXQFOHDU,Q,/&GLVFXVVLRQVUHIHUHQFHKDVEHHQPDGHWRµPRUDO¶
dictates. Given their potential impact, thematic context and the fact that they cut across such 
                                                                    
3 E Valencia-Ospina, 7KH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)RXUth report on the protection of persons in the event of 
disasters81'RF$&1,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ,/&0D\6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V
Fourth Report) para.105. See also, E Valencia-Ospina, 7KH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V3UHOLPLQDU\UHSRUWRQWKH
protection of persons in the event of disasters UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 (ILC, 5 May 2008) (6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V
Preliminary Report). 
4 '.ULWVLRWLVµImagining WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPXQLW\¶(-,/ 
5 Reliefweb, Nepal Flash Appeal Revision: Nepal Earthquake April - September 2015 <http://reliefweb.int/ 
report/nepal/nepal-flash-appeal-revision-nepal-earthquake-april-september-2015> accessed 25 September 2015. 
For donors see, Financial Tracking Service, NEPAL - Earthquake - April 2015 <https://fts.unocha.org/reports/ 
daily/ocha_R24_E16575___1507240301.pdf> accessed 25 September 2015. 
6 E Ferris and D Petz, A Year of Living Dangerously: A Review of Natural Disasters in 2010 (The Brookings 
Institution, London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, April 2011) 22. 
fundamental notions of state sovereignty, it is unfortunate, but perhaps unsurprising, that the 
language of the ILC Draft Articles is inconsistent and unclear. The articulation of duties and 
obligations appears interchangeably in the Draft Articles and Commentaries which hampers a 
IXOOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSURMHFW¶VLPSOLFDWLRQV,QDQHIIRUWWRRIIHUFODULILFDWLRQLWLV
VXEPLWWHGWKDWDµULJKW¶LVOHJDOO\HPSRZHULQJDQµREOLJDWLRQ¶LVDQLQescapable legal burden 
ZKLFKFDQEHHQIRUFHGµUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶LQGLFDWHVKRZDQHQWLW\VKRXOGEHKDYHDQGDµmoral 
dictate¶ suggests a reflection upon conscience. Real definitional difficulties arise with the 
QRWLRQRIDµGXW\¶$VZLOOEHGLVFXVVHGVXEVHTXently, the ILC texts use the term to convey 
both a legal obligation and something less strict than this. This definitional obscurity is 
aggravated by the likelihood that the Draft Articles will remain soft law. At the very least, it 
might be said that DµGXW\¶PD\HQWDLODOHJDOREOLJDWLRQbut definitely conveys a strong 
HQFRXUDJHPHQWGLUHFWLRQWRZDUGVDSDUWLFXODUFRXUVHRIDFWLRQ,QLWVOHVVHUIRUPDµGXW\¶LV
unlikely to have an enforcement mechanism.   
Given the current patterns of global wealth inequality and the increased impact of 
GLVDVWHUVXSRQLPSRYHULVKHGDQGXQGHUGHYHORSHGVWDWHVDµGXW\WRGRQDWH¶DSSHDUVDWWUDFWLYH
Indeed, the Special Rapporteur in his fifth report when discussing the contours of the duty to 
co-operate (draft article 8) noted that this duty taken together with a right to provide 
assistance raised a fundamental issue: 
« the nature of cooperation has to be shaped by its purpose, which in the present 
context is to provide disaster relief assistance. Seen from the larger perspective of 
public international law, to be legally and practically effective WKH6WDWHV¶GXW\WR
cooperate in the provision of disaster relief must strike a fine balance between 
three important aspects. First, such a duty cannot intrude into the sovereignty of 
the affected State. Second, the duty has to be imposed on assisting States as a 
legal obligation of conduct. Third, the duty has to be relevant and limited to 
disaster relief assistance, by encompassing the various specific elements that 
normally make up cooperation on this matter.7 
However, as he acknowledged, given that WKHµRYHUZKHOPLQJPDMRULW\¶RIstates 
which submitted written comments in the Sixth Committee were focussed in their firm belief 
that no duty to provide assistance existed under general international law,8 he could not but 
reaffirm his previously reached conclusion that the cooperative duty did not currently include 
a legal duty for States to provide assistance when requested by an affected state.9 One ILC 
delegate thought that a solution might lie in drawing up an additional article regarding a duty 
WRJLYHµGXHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶WRUHTXHVWVIRUDVVLVWDQFHIURPDQDIIHFWHGVWDWH10 Reflecting the 
progressive development of international law, it would highlight the need for the requested 
state to fulfil its duty to cooperate in good faith. This suggestion, however, leaves much 
discretion for non-affected states and room for endless debate as to the requirements and 
OLPLWVRIµGXHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶ 
Though, there is another possible compromise option. If there is no duty/obligation to 
provide aid, or such fierce resistance against it so as to make it a vain pursuit for its 
advocates, what of a duty/obligation to offer assistance? Attractive in itself (given notions of 
international solidarity) it is in tune with the draft article 8 duty of co-operation, and has 
support. Although intuitively this seems the weaker option (compared with the duty to 
provide aid) there are two reasons for favouring it. The first is a practical reason. An 
obligation/duty upon external actors to provide aid will definitely be resisted, but some states 
on the Sixth Committee states actually did make their submissions in terms of a duty to offer 
assistance. For example, the Polish representative suggested both that the draft article should 
                                                                    
7 E Valencia-Ospina, 7KH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)LIWKUHSRUWRQWKHSURWHFWLRQRISHUVRQVLQWKHHYHQWRI
disasters, UN Doc. A/CN.4/652 (ILC, 9 April 20126SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)LIWK5HSRUWSDUDHPSKDVLV
added). 
8 ILC, Report on the work of the sixty-fourth session, UN Doc. A/67/10 (2012) (Report on the work of the sixty-
fourth session) para 57; 6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)LIWK5HSRUWQpara 52. 
9 SpeciDO5DSSRUWHXU¶VFifth Report (n 7) para 68. 
10 See statement by Mr Hassouna in ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3139th meeting, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.3139 (14 August 2012) 4 (Provisional summary record of the 3139th meeting). 
be recast to portray offers of assistance as a positive duty and that the ILC should seek to 
encourage the international community to make such offers on the basis of the principles of 
cooperation and international solidarity.11 Indeed, in 2012, ILC member Mr Kittichaisaree 
also suggested that WKHWHUPµright¶ should be replaced E\µpositive duty¶.12  Secondly, a duty 
to provide aid raises difficult questions regarding differentiated capacities of states and 
organisations, and the allocation of responsibilities.13 These arise less potently with a duty to 
offer aid, making it is less easy to resist. Finally, while ostensibly weaker than a duty to 
provide assistance, somewhat counter-intuitively, in fact it may better safeguard affected 
states. Admittedly if an offeror reneged on an offer, it would be difficult to seek redress.  
However, assuming that the majority of offers made are realistic and in good faith, once 
made, the decision to accept or reject them (albeit in limited terms) resides with the affected 
state. The danger with a duty to provide aid lies in the potential that a donor state becomes 
focussed on the discharge of its duty instead of prioritising the needs of the affected state. At 
best this results in inappropriate or badly timed aid, at worst it legally facilitates a Trojan 
horse. Certainly, there are difficulties surrounding WKHZRUGµGXW\¶, which will be discussed 
below. This, however, is part of a general terminological problem with the ILC project and 
does not remove the imperative for the ILC to re-FRQVLGHUZKHWKHUWKHXVHRIµULJKW¶ZLWKLQ
draft aUWLFOHLVFRUUHFWRUDSSURSULDWHJLYHQWKHSURMHFW¶VWKUXVW14   
This chapter considers, in the context of these ILC Draft Articles, what is meant by a 
µright¶ for international actors to offer assistance. Is there only a right to assist? Although we 
do not dwell on this point, is it problematic that the Draft Articles say nothing, per se, about a 
right to receive aid? Given the wider terrain of international disaster response law (IDRL15), 
                                                                    
11 Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 21st meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.21 (2 December 2011) para 86. 
12 ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3141st meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3141 (23 November 2012) 17. 
13 See Mr Nolte, ibid 6. 
14 Report on the work of the sixty-fourth session (n 8) para 57.  
15 µ,'5/¶GHULYHVIURPDLQLWLDWLYHRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO)HGHUDWLRQRI5HG&URVVDQG5HG&UHVFHQW6RFLHWLHV
(IFRC) to assist in creating clarity about this area by way of a legal database. See IFRC, International disaster 
and the fact that the acknowledged focus of the Draft Articles is the protection of stricken 
populations, might a potential duty/obligation to offer assistance already exist?  For example 
some international organizations or their specialized agencies have specific mandates and 
therefore are obliged to respond to disasters. Further, it is arguable that the articulation of a 
right to donate raises legitimate expectations of donees, which in turn potentially fuels a duty 
to at least offer assistance. If in fact no duty/obligation to offer assistance exists for external 
actors, should it? Given that draft article 14 directs disaster-DIIHFWHGVWDWHVQRWWRµDUELWUDULO\¶
withhold consent to external assistance, does this, along with the co-operative duty articulated 
in draft Article 8, strengthen the argument for a duty/obligation to offer aid?  If not, the ILC 
Draft Articles will be struck asymmetrically with the heavier burden falling on the disabled 
state. There is undoubtedly a desire to clearly demarcate the differing and specific rights and 
obligations of affected and assisting states. Draft aUWLFOH¶VFRPPHQWDU\QRWHVDQ\JHQHUDO
statement on the obligation of states to ensure an adequate and effective response was 
avoided for fear of failing to capture these differences. However, concerns regarding affected 
states using a draft aUWLFOHGXW\WRµGHYROYH¶WKHLUREOLJDWLRQVWRH[WHUQDODFWRUVDUH
unfounded because draft Article 12 stresses the primary duty of affected states.   
This chapter analyses draft article 16 in its own terms and in the context of the other 
draft articles and considers whether this right to offer assistance to disaster-affected states 
suggests or encourages the possibility of an obligation/duty for external actors to at least offer 
assistance in times of natural disasters, and, if it does not, whether the ILC should be clearer 
about the limits of assistance being articulated.  As we do, however, acknowledge, the ILC 
has made significant strides with this project. Ultimately, the resistance of states (as seen in 
the submissions to the Sixth Committee) to the more bold initiatives suggested by the ILC 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
response laws, rules and principles <http://www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/disaster-law/about-disaster-
law/international-disaster-response-laws-rules-and-principles/#sthash.zrchJX1L.dpuf> accessed 25 September 
2015. 
(regarding offers of aid donation or the formation of a binding convention) continues to 
hamper its work. 
2. Definitions - What type of help? 
Draft article 3 defines disasters.16 If a duty to offer aid were established, it would be 
important to generally GHILQHµDLG¶ with sufficient flexibility given the context of a disaster¶V 
occurrence and taking account of any customary and specific treaty developments. There are 
a number of different stages of post-disaster aid ranging from short-term, life-saving 
emergency aid and recovery measures,17 through to more future-facing reconstruction, 
capacity-building and proactive mitigation measures. Currently, draft article 16 seems 
primarily focussed premised on the actual occurrence of a disaster rather than its pre-
emption,18 and upon emergency relief.   
Draft article 4 defines µrelief personnel¶ as including either civilian or military 
SHUVRQQHOµExWHUQDODVVLVWDQFH¶ includes relief personnel, equipment and goods, and services 
provided to an affected state by assisting states or other assisting actors for disaster relief/risk 
reduction. Relevant equipment and gRRGVDUHXQGHUVWRRGWRLQFOXGHµsupplies, tools, 
machines, specially trained animals, foodstuffs, drinking water, medical supplies, means of 
shelter, clothing, bedding, vehicles and other objects¶. Most existing IDRL provisions which 
detail appropriate aid19 stress timeliness of delivery20 and refer to essential,21 µimmediate¶22 
                                                                    
16 7KHGUDIWDUWLFOHUHDGVLQIXOOµ³'LVDVWHU´PHDQVa calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread 
loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby 
VHULRXVO\GLVUXSWLQJWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIVRFLHW\¶ 
17 IFRC, Annotations to the Draft Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International 
Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (2007) (Annotations to the IDRL Guidelines) s 2(3).See also 
Human Rights Council, Final research-based report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on best 
practices and main challenges in the promotion and protection of human rights in post-disaster and post-
conflict situations, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/76 (10 February 2015). See also the Botswana National Policy on 
Disaster Management 1986 (para 7); and Ethiopian National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management 
(October 1993) s II(2). 
18 See the commentary to draft article 16, ILC, Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session, UN Doc. A/69/10 
(2014) (Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session) 130, para 4. 
19 See the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and 
Relief Operations (adopted 18 June 1998, entered into force 8 January 2005) (Tampere Convention); and ILC, 
Protection of persons in the event of disasters, UN Doc. A/CN.4/590/Add.1 (Secretariat Memorandum 
Addendum, 28 February 2008) (Secretariat Memorandum Addendum) Annex I. 
needs, and those µLQGLVSHQVDEOHWRVXUYLYDO¶23 The 1994 Mohonk Criteria24 (a key reference 
point in IDRL sourcing) FLWHWKDWZKLFKLVµnecessDU\WRVXVWDLQOLIHDQGGLJQLW\¶..25 
Emergency humanitarian assistance undoubtedly incOXGHVµIRRGFORWKLQJmedicines, 
WHPSRUDU\VKHOWHUDQGKRVSLWDOHTXLSPHQW¶26 water, bedding and sanitation facilities.27  While 
such documents ably outline material assistance, it is less easy for them to identify the 
protection activities (for example, guarding against trafficking of children or gender-based 
violence) which are also a fundamental aspect of humanitarian action. The concept of 
humanitarian action (rather than just assistance) simultaneously embraces both the material 
needs and protection of stricken populations, and is a more helpful way of looking at needs-
based and rights-based assistance.28 This is somewhat reflected in draft article 9 which 
considers forms of cooperation between relevant actors.29  Such cooperation includes 
humanitarian assistance, the coordination of international relief actions and communications, 
and the making available of relief personnel, equipment and goods, and scientific, medical 
and technical resources. This list of examples is illustrative and explanatory rather than 
exhaustive.30   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
20 See the reference to rapid and effective relief in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (26 July 2005) (2005 ASEAN Agreement). 
21 ILC Draft Articles (n 2), art 2.  
22 Annotations to the IDRL Guidelines, (n 17) s 2(2). 
23 See also Bruges Resolution (n 1) art I(1)(a). 
24 See, the Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance formed by the Program on 
Humanitarian Assistance, Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (February 
1994) (Mohonk Criteria); -0(EHUVROHµ7KH0RKRQN&ULWHULDIRU$VVLVWDQFHLQ&RPSOH[(PHUJHQFLHV¶+54
(1995) 192. 
25 See also International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian 
Assistance (1993) (San Remo Principles) SULQFLSOHUHJDUGLQJµVXUYLYDO¶QHHGV 
26 Hardcastle and Chua (n 1) 591. 
27 Agreement between Member States and Associate Members of the Association of Caribbean States for 
Regional Cooperation on Natural Disasters (adopted 24 July1999) (Caribbean Association Agreement) art 1. 
28 See E Ferris, The Politics of Protection (Brookings, 2011) and ILC Draft Articles (n 2) art 10 considering 
cooperation for disaster risk reduction. 
29 See inspiration from the Draft Articles on the law of Transboundary Aquifers, in particular Article 7.  
30 ILC, Report on the work of the sixty-fifth session, UN Doc. A/68/10 (2013) (Report on the work of the sixty-
fifth session) 76-7.  See also the ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters (26 June 
1976); and Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, GA 
Res. 46/182 (19 December 1991) para 27. 
The Special Rapporteur was explicit that there is no intention to create any additional 
legal obligations for either affected states or assisting actors to engage in certain activities.31  
As noted already, this comports well with the weak terms of article 16, that is, a right to offer 
assistance, but it sits slightly awkwardly with the article 8 duty to co-operate and article 14 
regarding obligations of the affected state.  
3. The ILC Project 
3.1. Expectations of Assistance  
As acknowledged, there has long been an understanding that following disasters, 
humanitarian relief will be forthcoming from states, international governmental organizations 
(IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which stricken states will generally 
accept. Evidence of humanitarian practices gives encouragement to those seeking to 
strengthen an international sense of solidarity. Indeed, many of the current ILC draft articles 
reflect the historical presumption of available externally-provided assistance.32 The good 
faith of external actors offering assistance is widely presumed (although not on an irrebutable 
basis). Expectations of assistance are further bolstered by principle 6 of the San Remo 
Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance33 which notes that in the event of refusal 
of either offers of assistance, or access to the victims when humanitarian access is agreed 
upon, states and organisations concerned may µundertake all necessary steps to ensure such 
access¶ according to humanitarian and human rights principles.34 In recognising a right, this 
principle moves very quickly to suggesting a responsibility and significantly elevates the 
profile and potential power of assisters. There are at least two ways of reading draft article 
                                                                    
31 Report on the work of the sixty-fifth session (n 30) 77. 
32 Draft articles 10 and 11 concern cooperation for disaster reduction and the duty to reduce the risk of disasters 
respectively. See also draft article 13 (the duty of the state to seek external assistance); 14 (consent of the 
affected state to external assistance); 15(conditions on the provision of external assistance); 17 (facilitation of 
external assistance); and 19 (termination of external assistance). 
33 San Remo Principles (n 25). 
34 ibid, principle 6 (emphasis added). 
16: either, conservatively, as a codification of existing, discretionary practice or, more 
progressively, as signposting the way for development of an obligation/duty. 
3.2. Codifying and cementing the legal terrain 
If external actors routinely fulfil the expectations of aid implied in notions of 
international cooperation and embodied in many general and specialised IDRL instruments 
(which will be discussed subsequently), is there any need for further legal codification?  
Probably there is, because IDRL has historically been complicated and patchy to the extent 
that its identity as a discrete area of law has been challenged. While there exist a number of 
key reference points such as the 1994 Mohonk criteria and the 2007 IFRC/IDRL Guidelines35 
these are somewhat free-floating and soft. Given this situation of a legal mosaic where the 
tiles are yet to be affixed, the ILC is to be commended for undertaking the unenviable task of 
organising the law regarding disasters, and indeed cementing the very concept of IDRL as a 
coherent specialism. The study sees itself DVGHPDUFDWLQJDOHJDOµVSDFH¶36 whereby a 
framework of key concepts and principles might be identified. Despite the Special 
5DSSRUWHXU¶VLQFOLQDWLRQIRUDIUDPHZRUNFRQYHQWLRQLWLVOLNHO\WKH contribution will be to 
the soft law terrain via non-binding guidelines.37 This route, although criticised for repeating 
IFRC efforts,38 may be more practical and receive the widest possible acceptance given the 
number of actors involved. Although still soft, the ILC project aims to consolidate the legal 
landscape and recognise the full range of actors working on the terrain of disasters, with a 
view to highlighting the importance of, as well as better facilitating, co-operation among key 
                                                                    
35 Annotations to the IDRL Guidelines (n 17), the use of which was urged in Strengthening the coordination of 
emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, GA Res. 63/139 (5 March 2009). 
36 )=RU]L*LXVWLQLDQLµ7KH:RUNVRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQRQ3URWHFWLRQRI3ersons in the Event 
RI'LVDVWHUV´¶LQA De Guttry, M Gestri and G Venturini (eds.), International Disaster Response Law (TMC 
Asser Press, 2012 ) 69. 
37 SpHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V3UHOLPLQDU\5eport (n 3) para 60; ILC, Report on the work of the sixty-third session UN 
Doc. A/66/10 (2011) (Report on the work of the sixty-third VHVVLRQSDUDDQG6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)RXUWK
Report (n 3) para 25, Statement by representative of the UK in UNGA, Summary record of the 24th meeting, 
Sixth Committee, UN Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.24 (1 December 2010); and Statement by representative of Russia in 
UNGA, Summary record of the 23rd meeting, Sixth Committee, UN Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.23 (1 December 2010). 
38 Zorzi Giustinani, (n 36) 69, arguing that only a treaty would have real added value. 
international entities.39 Draft article 16 declares the legitimate interest of the international 
community, states and organisations in the disaster context and reflects the diminution in 
state sovereignty evident since 1945, most notably as a result of human rights law.40 It 
clarifies that offering relief is not to be seen as an unfriendly act. This is the straightforward 
codificatory reading of article 16. More interesting issues arise with the progressive 
GHYHORSPHQWGLPHQVLRQRIWKH,/&¶VZRUNDQGZHKDYHZULWWHQHOVHZKHUHUHJDUGLQJWKH
progressiveness of the draft articles covering the duty to co-operate/right to refuse aid.41  
Draft aUWLFOH¶VVWDWXVDSSHDUVILUVWDVDPHUHUHLWHUDWLRQRISKLODQWKURSLFSUDFWLFHVRI
external international actors.  However, is it possible that its terms suggest (perhaps even 
unintentionally) a pathway developing towards a duty of offering assistance? 
Draft article 16 walks a fine line between rhetoric and reality. The actual terms of 
draft Article 16 merely reflect a discretionary right to offer assistance. As noted already, 
despite key cooperative duties being premised on an expectation that aid will be forthcoming, 
this ILC-articulated right to offer assistance, ostensibly an embodiment of international 
solidarity and cosmopolitan responsibility, is merely optional.42 However, the flip-side of 
cosmopolitan global co-operative responsibility, as embodied in the stricken state¶VGXW\ both 
to seek and not arbitrarily refuse aid, has very little room for manoeuvre. With its sovereignty 
                                                                    
39 In August 2014, the ILC transmitted the draft Articles through the UN Secretary-General to Governments, 
competent international organizations, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies for comments and 
observations, to be submitted by January 2016. Comments from UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UNISDR were also welcomed. 
40 (Report on the work of the sixty-third session) (n 37) para 277. 
41 C Allan DQG72¶'RQQHOOµA Call to Alms?: Natural Disasters, R2P, Duties of Cooperation and Uncharted 
Consequences¶(2012) 17 JCSL 337; C Allan and 72¶'RQQHOOµ$Q2IIHU<RX&DQQRW5HIXVH"1DWXUDO
'LVDVWHUVWKH3ROLWLFVRI$LG5HIXVDODQG3RWHQWLDO/HJDO,PSOLFDWLRQV¶(2013) Amsterdam Law Forum 5  36. 
42 Although in fairness, it reflects Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
(that is, right to offer services). See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) (First 
Geneva Convention) art 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950); 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 
21 October 1950) art 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) art 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) (API); Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978)(APII). 
seemingly significantly fettered, the role for the disaster-affected state is predominantly one 
of duty. The role for the unaffected, donor state or body is primarily discretionary. Such 
asymmetry is striking but is it defensible, especially given the comparative vulnerability of 
the different actors involved? It might be considered that a duty to offer assistance would be 
more equitable. Of course such a duty could not be identically imposed. Any obligation/duty 
would have to be differentiated to take into account individual state capacity but this is 
inherent in the proposed duty to offer, rather than provide, assistance. Indeed the commentary 
to draft article 1 states that the Draft Articles cover ratione materiae disaster-affected states, 
third states, LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGRWKHUHQWLWLHVµin a position to cooperate, 
SDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHSURYLVLRQRIGLVDVWHUUHOLHIDQGDVVLVWDQFH¶.43 Further, the practice of 
differentiated obligations according to capacity is already in place in human rights law, 
particularly for developing states with regard to the achievement of socio-economic rights.   
Is there any scope to re-read draft aUWLFOH¶VµULJKW¶"'UDIWaUWLFOH¶VRZQWHUPV
are fairly modest, but the accompanying Commentaries are a little more bold and say that in 
the case of states, the United Nations (UN) and other IGOs, such bodies are µencouraged to 
make offers of assistance¶ to a disaster-affected state.44  While arguably this represents the 
ILC making policy recommendations, rather than offering legal clarification, perhaps, 
instead, this noWLRQRIµHQFRXUDJHPHQW¶PRUHFOHDUO\UHIOHFWVRXUVXJJHVWHGLGHDRIµGXW\¶DQG
thus is legally, rather than politically, contoured. Further, draft aUWLFOH¶Vcontextualisation 
within the body of the other draft Articles is important. It complements draft articles 8, which 
outlines a duty of key actors to co-operate, and 9 outlining forms of cooperation. It also 
undoubtedly bolsters the power of draft Articles 13 and 1445 which clearly put pressure on 
affected states to accept externally-provided aid. Taken together, it might be said that the 
overall Draft Articles point to a strong expectation of assistance from able actors which might 
                                                                    
43 (emphasis added).  
44 Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 130, para 4. (emphasis added). 
45 Duty of the affected state to seek, and consent to, external assistance respectively.   
in fact be read as a duty of offering. Whether or not such a reading is feasible, the question 
remains: should such a duty be included? 
Arguably the ILC Draft Articles are not suitably equipped to impose duties of 
assistance and aid arrangements. However, while such arrangements might be more 
efficiently created and expressed in bilateral, trilateral or regional treaties which better 
estimate the type and extent of disasters likely to befall a region, a general duty of offering 
assistance is unlikely to compromise such existing arrangements. Indeed, a general duty 
could form a normative basis for treaty duties, and they in turn may provide evidence for the 
hardening of such a duty in a mutually reinforcing fashion.46 Between them they may even 
produce an obligation of assistance. 
The explicit articulation of such a duty (inherently tailored according to state 
capacity) would balance the ILC Draft Articles more clearly and do so without requiring 
external actors to behave any differently from their current practice. It would, however, 
remove the discretionary element of when, and to which disaster-stricken states, offers are 
made. Again, this would more clearly mirror WKHIHWWHULQJRIDVWULFNHQVWDWH¶VULJKWWRUHIXVH  
The ILC is always very cautious to stress when a drafting project is codifying or progressing 
the law. This project is no exception ± it comprises a good deal of progressive development.47  
The difficult line to navigate is when there is a move from progressive development to 
creationism.48 It is this latter possibility (and the danger of creating an obligation or implying 
secondary duties on the part of non-disaster-affected entities and the international community 
to respond) that alarmed some ILC delegates and states.49 
                                                                    
46 D &XELHµAn Enchanted Tool? Humanitarian Assistance and the ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of 
Persons in the Event of Disasters¶(2009-2010) Irish Yearbook of International Law Vol.IV-V 119. 
47 6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V3UHOLPLQDU\5HSRUWQ paras 9 and 42; Report on the work of the sixty-third session (n 
37) para 285. 
48 6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶VFifth Report (n 7) para 52.  
49 ILC, Report on the work of the sixty-second session, UN Doc. A/65/10 (2010) (Report on the work of the 
sixty-second session) paras 318-19. 
However, a proposed duty to offer assistance might not in fact be a creative revolution 
in international law. A duty (rather than a right) of assistance has legal antecedents in IDRL.  
Article V of the 2003 Bruges Resolution outlined duties in respect of humanitarian assistance 
DQGVWDWHGWKDWµ>D@ll States should to the maximum extent possible offer humanitarian 
assistance to the victims in States affected by disasters¶.50 IGOs were addressed similarly.  
Article VI stated that in organising, providing and distributLQJDVVLVWDQFHµassisting States and 
organizations shall FRRSHUDWHZLWKWKHDXWKRULWLHVRIWKHDIIHFWHG6WDWHRU6WDWHV¶.51 A 
similarly phrased direction pertained to states regarding mitigating consequences where a 
disaster affected more than one state.52 These terms imply a stronger duty of initiation, that is,  
a duty to at least offer assistance. The 2003 Bruges Resolution does not stand alone. The 
influential 1994 Mohonk document also makes reference to responsibilities to provide 
assistance during complex emergencies. It notes that where the authorities of a disaster-
affected state are unable or unwilling to provide life-sustaining aid, it is both the right and the 
obligation of the international FRPPXQLW\µto protect and provide relief to affected and 
threatened civilian populations in conformity with the principles RILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶.53   
Thus, draft aUWLFOH¶VWHUPVarticulate a right, the Commentaries strongly suggest the 
right should be exercised where possible, the rest of the articles are premised on the fact that 
the assistance has been offered and key IDRL referencing instruments suggest a duty of 
(actual) assistance and maybe even an obligation. This is confusing. 
4. Duties/rights/obligations/responsibilities 
:KDW¶VLQDQDPH" 
The articulation of duties and obligations appears interchangeably in the Draft 
Articles and their Commentaries. One ILC delegate thought it better not to avoid focussing 
                                                                    
50 Bruges Resolution (n 1) art V. 
51 ibid art VI (emphasis added). 
52 ibid art VI(2). 
53 Mohonk Criteria (n 24) PtII(4) (emphasis added). 
on determining rights and duties and opt for wording that simply encouraged states to offer 
and accept assistance in disasters.54 Another approved of WKH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶VJHQHUDO
SUHIHUHQFHIRUµGXW\¶UDWKHUWKDQµREOLJDWLRQ¶because it indicated something between a moral 
dictate and a legal obligation.55 However, this leaves some obscurity and produces a chess 
game of language. As noted already, IDRL is in a complex state. It comprises soft law, treaty 
law, customary law, guidelines and codes, the status and enforceability of which is often 
quite unclear. In a sense, IDRL exemplifies the unstable nature and unpredictable outcomes 
of norms operating in a de-centralised legal system. By way of illustration, the Mohonk 
Criteria refer to both the right and the obligation of the international community to assist 
when disaster-affected states are unable or unwilling to provide aid. This assumes that a right 
also carries an obligation. Further, as noted above, the duties/rights/obligations of potential 
external donors seem to differ between the ILC draft Articles, the 2003 Bruges Resolution 
and the 1994 Mohonk criteria. So, if the ILC Draft Articles were designed to clarify matters, 
they may still have some way to go. 
4.2. Terms 
The commentary to draft aUWLFOHUHIHUVWRµULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQV¶RIUHOHYDQWDFWRUV, 
but draft aUWLFOHVDOOUHIHUWRDSDUWLFXODUµGXW\¶ The commentary to draft Article 
2 (outlining the entire project¶VSXUSRVHVWDWHVWKDWµ[t]he obligations of States are considered 
in draft articles 11[16], 12[9], 13[10], 14[11], 17 [14] and 18¶. Draft articles 14, 17 and 18 
certainly follow the language of obligation.56 However, draft aUWLFOH¶VFRPPHQWDU\
overlooks draft article 8. Draft aUWLFOH¶VWLWOHPD\RQO\UHIHUWRDµGXW\WRFRRSHUDWH¶EXWLWV
WHUPVDFWXDOO\XWLOLVHREOLJDWRU\ODQJXDJHµ6WDWHVVKDOO«¶).  Draft articles 11,57 1258 and 1359 
                                                                    
54 See statement by Mr Murphy in Provisional summary record of the 3139th meeting (n 10) 18. 
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56 The µDIIHFWHG6WDWHVKDOO«¶. 
57 Concerning risk reduction. 
58 Concerning an affected state¶VUROH. 
DOVRXVHWKHWHUPµGXW\¶ (draft article 1 only in its title) but article 2 refers to them all as 
obligatory. Thus, draft artiFOH¶VFRPPHQWDU\ apparently synoymizes µGXW\¶DQGµREOLJDWLRQ¶
for some draft articles but not others.   
Draft article 16 refers only to a right of external actors to offer assistance. Could a 
right, ever be understood as a duty, an obligation, a responsibility, or a moral imperative?  
'UDIW$UWLFOH¶VDFFRPSDQ\LQJGUDIWFRPPHQWDU\LVH[SOLFLWLQUHIXVLQJWRrecognise a 
µOHJDOGXW\¶SUHVXPDEO\DQREOLJDWLRQWRDVVLVW+RZHYHU this is perhaps more about 
anxieties regarding an obligation to actually provide aid. If the ILC project is driven by an 
ethos of protection, then this assumes a general duty of care and responsibility. Such a duty 
resists any enforceable private-law type obligation but reflects international, inter-state 
comity. It is under the auspices of such responsible inter-state neighbourliness that a duty of 
offering assistance might sit. This perspective echoes views of certain states on the Sixth 
Committee. The Polish position has been noted already. Both Thailand and Sri Lanka also 
queVWLRQHGWKHXVHRIWKHZRUGµULJKW¶Thailand considered µduty¶ more appropriate since 
offers of assistance from the international community were part of international cooperation 
(as opposed to an assertion of rights).60 The Sri Lankan delegation also urged a redrafting to 
present the offer of disaster relief as a positive duty of the international community.61   
Despite the thrust of the ILC project being the protection of persons affected by 
disasters (with implicit and qualified recognition of the rights of disaster-affected states62) 
explicit reference to the language of rights appears only in two articles, both very general: 
draft aUWLFOHRQWKHSURMHFW¶VSXUSRVHDQGdraft article 6 detailing the need to respect for 
VWULFNHQSHRSOH¶VULJKWV(TXDOO\WKe concept of protection is not defined fully in the Draft 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
59 &RQFHUQLQJWKHDIIHFWHGVWDWH¶VGXW\WRVHHNH[WHUQDODVVLVWDQFH. 
60 UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 24th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24 (1 December 2011) 
para 92.  
61 UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 27th meeting, UN Doc A/C.6/66/SR.27 (8 December 2011) 
para.20 
62 See draft Articles 12(2), 14 and 19.  
Articles or Commentaries. Yet, the notion of responsibility of the international community, of 
third states and particularly of disaster-affected states is ever-present.63 $UWLFOH¶VµULJKW¶
also has to be read in the context of draft article 13 which refers to the duty of a disaster-
affected state to seek assistance from external actors. To what extent does draft aUWLFOH¶V
language and thrust legitimise the expectations of stricken states and their populaces that 
assistance will be forthcoming, and thereby reify a duty upon those external bodies to offer 
aid, regardless of the precise terminology?   
It seems there are two issues to ponder when considering draft aUWLFOH¶V
interpretation. First, the wording of the article itself states that certain entities µKDYHWKHright 
WRRIIHUDVVLVWDQFH¶64 WRDQDIIHFWHGVWDWH,WGRHVQRWVD\WKDWH[WHUQDOERGLHVµcan offer 
DVVLVWDQFH¶ZKLFKZRXOGEHPXFKPRUHUHIOHFWLYHRIWKHHQWLUHO\GLVFUHWLRQDU\QDWXUH of 
philanthropy and goodwill (rather than the exercise of a legal right).65 Secondly, if any 
interpretation (of an implied duty) is misplaced then it would seem that the powerful 
ODQJXDJHRIµULJKWV¶DQGµlDZ¶LVµfig-leafing¶ the non-mandatory nature of draft article 16. 
4.3 Status of different duties and rights 
What is the hierarchical relationship (in terms of authority) between obligations, 
responsibilities, duties and rights? As noted, the current Draft Articles have an overarching 
theme of responsibility, they promote certain duties and recognise certain rights, but what do 
they actually do? While it has been suggested that they should be hortatory, facilitative and 
promotional, rather than legally binding and enforceable,66 the widespread referencing of the 
2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility has shown the power of such ostensibly 
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64 (emphasis added).   
65 See statement by Mr Murase in Provisional summary record of the 3102nd meeting (n 55) 15. 
66 ibid 14. 
µVRIW¶LQVWUXPHQWV67 It might be argued that the substantive provenance of the State 
Responsibility Articles was stronger. However, Special Rapporteur Valencia-OspLQD¶VFDUHIXO
exploration of existing international law and its progressive development, and his inclination 
for a possible framework convention,68 suggest that these ILC Draft Articles are less tentative 
than they may appear. Likely to prove both authoritative and persuasive, they will 
undoubtedly contribute to the concretisation of IDRL.   
As Sivakumaran notes, ILC drafting practice utilises three techniques: generalising 
from more specific instruments, analogising to related bodies of law and, finally, the 
development of a normative framework.69 Undoubtedly the 2001 Draft Articles did not 
impose obligations, or establish state responsibility for the breach of an obligation or apply 
sanctions in case of non-fulfilment of that responsibility ± they simply reflected and codified 
custom. Where progressive development was being made, that was explicit. However, this is 
less the case with the current Draft Articles. Indeed, arguably the Draft Articles have 
(problematically) created, or at least helped to crystallise, something of a duty to accept aid, 
despite the tentative terms and soft status of the instruments upon which they base that duty.70  
:KHQWU\LQJWRXQSDFNQRWLRQVRIµGXW\¶DQGWKHUHODWLYHVWDWXVRIGLIIHUHQWGXWLHVLWPLJKWEH
asked, whether there is a difference between a codifying duty (effectively an obligation) and 
DSURJUHVVLYHGXW\VRPHWKLQJOHVVWKDQDQREOLJDWLRQ"6LPLODUO\LIµGXWLHV¶GRQRWFUHDWH
actual obligations do they create expectations (of action/assistance)?  While draft article 16 
refers to a right not a duty, its interpretation will be guided by draft article 1. 
4.4 Draft article 1 and responsibility 
The commentary to draft article 1 states that the:  
                                                                    
67 Cited even prior to finalising, see *DEþLNRYR-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) ICJ Rep 1997 (25 
September 1997) 7; France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal (Rainbow Warrior) 82 ILR 500 (30 April 1990). 
68 Despite resistance towards it, see above n 37 and associated text. 
69 S Sivakumaran, µ7HFKQLTXHVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ-Making: The Emergence of an International Disaster 
Response Law (currently unpublished manuscript) 
70 $OODQDQG2¶'RQQHOOµ$FDOOWR AlPV¶Q1) 345-6.  
draft articles cover, ratione materiae, the rights and obligations of States affected 
by a disaster in respect of persons present on their territory (irrespective of 
nationality) or under their jurisdiction or control, third States and international 
organizations and other entities in a position to cooperate, particularly in the 
provision of disaster relief and assistance.71  
This last clause implies the imposition of responsibility and, as mentioned already, the Draft 
Articles are forceful in their exposition of the affected state¶VSULPDU\GXWLHV to co-operate, 
reduce risk and seek assistance, and to refrain from arbitrarily refusing consent to externally 
offered assistance.72 This is consistent with the concept of conditional sovereignty where 
DXWKRULW\LVSUHPLVHGXSRQµULJKWIXO¶OHJLWLPDWHH[HUFLVHRISRZHUand is reminiscent of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.   
53¶VUH-GHILQLWLRQRIµUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶HQWDLOHGDdefinite expectation of specific action 
(from the international community)73 and political attempts to invoke R2P in the natural 
disasters context have been strongly resisted.74 However, the ILC explicitly eschewed the 
ODQJXDJHRIµUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶LQWKHDraft Articles because of its transference into a term of 
art,75 SUHIHUULQJLQVWHDGWKHZRUGVµduty¶ aQGµUROH¶.76 TKH,/&¶VUHMHFWLRQRI53GRHVQRW
necessarily mean that for external actors there is no responsibility at all in disasters, just no 
µ53UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ As noted, a general theme of responsibility is returned to time and again 
in the Commentaries:77 draft article 8 articulates the general international cooperative duty 
and draft article 12 stresses the protective duty of disaster-affected states. Concepts of 
                                                                    
71 Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 90 para 2 (emphasis added). 
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73 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, (Report, 
December 2001) <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf> accessed 25 September 2015; AJ 
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Q41) 348.  
75 Commentary to draft Article 12, Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) , p.118  
76 ibid p.118-119  
77 See above WH[WEHIRUHQDQG$OODQDQG2¶'RQQHOOµ$&DOOIRU$OPV¶Q,QIDFW53¶Vrelevance to the 
ILC project was still being debated in Summer 2011, see Report on the work of the sixty-third session (n 37) 
para 286; Statement by Mr Vasciannie Pellet in Provisional summary record of the 3102nd meeting (n 55) 13. 
µKXPDQLW\ODZ¶78 DQGµFRPPRQZHDO¶KDYHXQGRXEWHGO\UHFHQWO\JDLQHGFXUUHQF\DQG, 
regardless of nomenclature, notions of international fellowship and solidarity clearly 
penetrate VRYHUHLJQ:HVWSKDOLDQERUGHUV6RZKDWRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VGXW\WR
safeguard the rights of benighted individuals? If the international responsibility of external 
actors in disasters is different to their responsibilities which arise during genocide,79 what 
does it entail? Does it give rise to an obligation, a duty, or a right? It is hard to conceive of a 
µPHUH¶responsibility which has no consequences in the event of dereliction. If no new 
obligations in disaster-settings are desirable, a duty to offer assistance in the Draft Articles 
could help operationalise existing human rights obligations incumbent upon states. Thus, 
third states would respect sovereignty principles and simply be (responsibly and horizontally) 
assisting stricken states to comply with their (protective and vertically applied) human rights 
obligations to protect.80  
5. Draft article 16 
Absent a specific prohibition restricting offers of assistance, some ILC members and 
states considered draft article 16 superfluous,81 but this is not a universal view. The Special 
Rapporteur asserted that it operationalized Vattelian notions of solidarity (which had 
informed the ILC project since its inception.82 It recognised the global interest in protecting 
stricken populations whose plight was straining the capacity of the affected sovereign state, 
ZKLOHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\FRQILUPLQJWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIWKHDIIHFWHGVWDWH¶VSULPDU\UHVSRQVLELOLW\83 
However, as noted throughout this piece, it is still questionable why such a strongly 
articulated humanitarian commitment was expressed only as a right. Indeed, the Special 
                                                                    
78 R Teitel, +XPDQLW\¶V/DZ(OUP, 2013). 
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80 D CXELHDQG0+HVVHOPDQµAccountability for the human rights implications of natural disasters: a proposal 
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82 6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)RXUWK5HSRUWQ 3) paras 78 and 84. 
83 ibid para 84; A/68/10 (n 30) 79. 
Rapporteur clarified that the draft article was concerned only with offers of assistance and not 
ZLWKWKHDFWXDOµprovision¶ thereof. Any such offers (either unilaterally made or in response to 
a request) were µessentially voluntary and should not be construed as recognition of the 
existence of a legal duty WRDVVLVW¶.84 This caveat was presumably included to reflect the 
anxieties being expressed in meetings by some ILC members and governments in the UNGA 
Sixth Committee. The Special Rapporteur was equally clear that there was no obligation on 
an affected state to accept an offer of assistance, although this was qualified by the terms of 
draft article 14 militating against bad faith refusals which as we have asserted, at its mildest, 
produces an unbalanced result. Of course stricken states remain the primary actor (draft 
article 12(2)), determine when national capacity is overwhelmed (draft article 13), can 
impose conditions on external assistance (draft article 15) and control when external 
DVVLVWDQFHLVUHTXLUHGDQGH[WHUQDODFWRUVUHTXLUHWKHDIIHFWHGVWDWH¶VFRQVHQW+RZHYHU
affected states are not hermetically sealed off from surrounding politics and are even more 
exposed and vulnerable and potentially less able to exercise (paper) choices, when in a 
weakened condition. Further, such provisions assume a functioning government still exists, 
which the aftermath of the 2010 Haitian earthquake, where large parts of the government 
apparatus were badly affected, shows is not necessarily the case.  
Finally, these Draft Articles must be read in the context of pre-existing specialist 
IDRL instruments. Such instruments (which the ILC already heavily relied on for the 
SURYLVLRQVD\LQJWKDWDQDIIHFWHGVWDWHµshall QRW¶ arbitrarily withhold its consent to aid)85 are 
more definite in their sense of an obligation for external actors to assist. While some ILC 
members were keen that draft article 16 did not create positive duties and specific legal 
obligations on the international community (including both third states and international 
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organisations) it will be interesting to see if the final version of the Draft Articles reflects 
such a conservative position.   
5.1 Offers by states 
As regards assistance from third states, the Special Rapporteur cited the provenance 
of Article 3 of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) 
1907 which established the right of third parties to offer their assistance in the event of an 
international dispute, while recognising the right of the disputing states to reject such means 
of reconciliation.86 Article 2(4) of the 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a 
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency notes that µStates Parties shall, within the limits 
of their capabilities, identify and notify the Agency of experts, equipment and materials 
which could87 be made available for the provision of assistance to other States Parties in the 
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency¶.88 Articles I and II of the 1991 Inter-
American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance refer to offers and acceptance of 
assistance from one state party to another.89   
As already noted, the Mohonk criteria suggest both a right and an obligation of the 
international community to offer assistance, and general human rights law may offer some 
guidance. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) 
General Comments has suggested a joint and individual responsibility of states to contribute 
in emergencies to the maximum of their capacities.90 However, the lack of development in 
this right/obligation/duty inevitably throws into doubt its strength and although there was a 
possibility that draft article 16 might have emboldened the duty, it seems clear that this will 
                                                                    
86  Fourth Report n.3 A/CN.4/643 para.85 
87 ,QIDLUQHVVLWGRHVQRWVD\µZLOO¶ 
88 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (adopted 26 
September 1986, entered into force 26 February 1987) art 2(4) (emphasis added).   
89 See also Tampere Convention (n 19) art 4; and 2005 ASEAN Agreement (n 20) arts 3-4. 
90 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 12 regarding the right 
to adequate food (Art 11 of the Covenant),, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999) (GC12) para 38 and 
CESCR, General Comment 14 regarding the right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art 11 of the 
Covenant), E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) (GC14) para 40. 
be resisted. At the same time, as noted, such insistence on its own may not be enough to stop 
this particular trajectory and again a duty to offer might be distinguished from a duty to 
contribute. 
5.2 Offers by international organisations 
The Special Rapporteur considered offers of assistance from IGOs and other 
humanitarian actors as belonging µto the acquis of the international law of disaster 
response¶.91  SXFKDFWRUV¶DVVLVWDQFHGRHVindeed have a long recognition in international law.  
In terms of instruments which specify the role of IGOs and NGOs, several UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) resolutions are relevant,92 and indeed the World Health Organisation and 
International Atomic Energy Agency are specifically empowered in the event of global health 
hazards and nuclear/radiological accidents respectively.93 The San Remo Guiding Principles 
on the Right to Offer Humanitarian Assistance also provide a right to offer assistance for the 
ICRC, UNHCR and other UN organisations and professional humanitarian bodies. Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Article 18 of 1977 Additional Protocol II, are 
also inclusive of such bodies.94  
The aforementioned landmark UN General Assembly resolution 43/131 (1988) was 
clear that the humanitarian work of NGOs was to be facilitated by affected states, and the 
support of all states to such organisations in their endeavours was urged.95 The Annotations 
to the 2007 IFRC IDRL Guidelines GHILQHµDVVLVWLQJDFWRUV¶DV including humanitarian 
                                                                    
91 6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)RXUWK5HSRUWQSDUD 
92 Notably Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, GA Res. 
43/131 (8 December 1988), especially preamble and paras 3-5. See also Strengthening the capacity of the 
United Nations system to respond to natural disasters and other disaster situations, GA Res. 36/225 (17 
December 1981) and Assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa, GA Res. 46/108 (16 
December 1991). 
93 World Health Organization (WHO), International Health Regulations (2nd edn, WHO, 2008) art 10(3); 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (n 89) art 5(d). 
94 6HHµLPSDUWLDOKXPDQLWDULDQERG\¶DQGµUHOLHIVRFLHWLHV¶LQ&RPPRQ$UWLFOHRIWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV
1949 (n 42) and Article 18(1) APII 1977 (n 42) respectively; Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 
130; Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance (adopted 7 June 1991) art XVI; the Tampere 
Convention (n 19); 2005 ASEAN Agreement (n 20) art 3.  
95 GA Res. 43/131 (n 93) paras 4-5. 
organisations, states, foreign individuals and private companies providing charitable relief or 
other foreign entities (section 2.14). This is a very open-ended definition which has been 
critiqued elsewhere.96 In the context of peacetime assistance, article 5 of the 1989 resolution 
of the Institut de Droit International, concerning the Protection of Human Rights and the 
Principle of Non-intervention in Internal Affairs of States, UHIHUVWRRIIHUVµE\D6WDWH a group 
of states, an international organization or an impartial humanitarian body such as the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLWWHHRIWKH5HG&URVVRIIRRGRUPHGLFDOVXSSOLHV¶LQFRQWH[WVZKHUHWKH
µOLIHRUKHDOWKRIWKHSRSXODWLRQLVVHULRXVO\WKUHDWHQHG¶7KLVLnstrument stresses that such 
assistance cannot be considered an unlawful intervention in the affected states.97 This 
SULQFLSOHZDVUHLWHUDWHGDQGVWUHQJWKHQHGLQWKLVVDPHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VUHVROXWLRQRQ
humanitarian assistance, Article IV of which stated that states and organizations had the right 
to offer humanitarian assistance to an affected state, and assuming such an offer had an 
exclusively humanitarian character, it would not be unlawful. The right to offer assistance to 
stricken populations was subject to the consent of the affected state. Strangely, only the 1989 
UHVROXWLRQ¶VZHDNHUWHUPVDUHUHIHUUHGWRLQWKH&RPPHQWDULHVWRGUDIWarticle 16.    
Draft aUWLFOHGLIIHUHQWLDWHVEHWZHHQVWDWHVWKH81DQGRWKHU,*2VZKLFKµKDYHWKH
ULJKW¶WRRIIHUDVVLVWDQFHDQGUHOHYDQW 1*2VZKLFKµPD\DOVRRIIHUDVVLVWDQFH¶WRDQDIIHFWHG
state. This differentiation ZKHUHE\1*2VGRQRWKDYHµULJKWV¶ may be explained by the fact 
WKDWGXULQJWKH,/&¶V6XPPHUPHHWLQJVVRPHPHPEHUVH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQWKDWthe 
draft article implied that NGOs enjoyed the same legal status as states and IGOs.98 Changing 
the phraseology more clearly provided an authorisation rather than a right.99 However, yet 
                                                                    
96 Allan and 2¶'RQQHOOµA Call for $OPV¶Q 41). 
97 See also San Remo Principles (n 25) principle 5, noting that exercising the right to offer help is not an 
unfriendly act or interference. 
98 Possibly by being endowed with international legal personality and rights ± see Topical summary of the 
discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its sixty-eighth session UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/666 (January 2014) 9. See also Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 130. Draft Article 
¶V&RPPHQWDU\DOVRDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHGLVWLQFWLYHREOLJDWLRQVKHOGE\WKHVHDFWRUVUHJDUGLQJhuman rights (at 
105 ff.).  
99 See detail in n.94 and associated text. 
again the phraseology causes further confusion - what is the difference between an 
authorisation and a right and a duty? Who is authorising the NGO? If the interpretation 
PHQWLRQHGHDUOLHUµFDQPD\¶RIIHUUDWKHUWKDQKDYLQJµWKHULJKWWRRIIHU¶LVIROORZHGSHUKDSV
the NGO load has EHHQµOLJKWHQHG¶± might this imply a more onerous burden for the other 
actors referred to in draft article 16? 2UGRHVWKHQRWLRQRIµDXWKRULVDWLRQ¶E\whom?) imply 
a transfer of responsibility from those other actors to NGOs? The latter could perhaps be 
implied from the commentaries to draft article 16 which single out states, the UN and IGOs, 
QRW1*2VDVEHLQJµencouragHGWRPDNHRIIHUVRIDVVLVWDQFH¶.100   
Presumptions regarding aid offers spring from notions of common humanity and 
although the Draft Articles are not human rights provisions as such, they arguably embody a 
human rights theme. The next section considers how Draft Article 16 might be read in the 
context of existing human rights law.  
6. Human rights 
6.1 Ethos 
Individuals suffer severe hardships when disasters occur. The Special Rapporteur 
favoured a rights based approach early on101 DQGWKH6HFUHWDULDW¶V0HPRUDQGXPFODULILHGWKH
core protective nature of existing human rights obligations as regards disaster-stricken 
populations.102 Draft article 6 specifically addresses the importance of protecting human 
rights. A more lukewarm endorsement appears in draft article 2 ZKLFKXUJHVµDQadequate and 
effective response « witKIXOOUHVSHFWIRU« >VWULFNHQSHRSOH¶V@ «ULJKWV¶. Nevertheless, the 
Draft Commentaries specifically reference the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) (notably the right to life) and the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).103   
                                                                    
100 Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 130. 
101 See Special Rapporteur¶VPreliminary report (n 3) paras 12, 25-6 and 62. 
102 Secretariat Memorandum Addendum (n 19) 3 
103 See the Commentaries to draft articles 2, 5, 7-8, 13-14 in Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18).   
6.2 Human rights duties of disaster-affected states 
Draft aUWLFOH¶VGXW\WRFR-operate and its prioritisation over sovereign initiative was 
defended in terms of its consonance with, and reflection in, human rights law. Interestingly 
the Special Rapporteur stressed the responsibilities of affected states referring to their 
µPDUJLQRIDSSUHFLDWLRQ¶104 which is human rights language. In his fourth report, the Special 
Rapporteur cited a number of human rights sources offering a relatively hard-edged view of 
the role and duties of affected states105 and their limited capacity to refuse aid. Indeed, 
misapplication of their margin of appreciation could produce an internationally wrongful act 
if aid-refusal undermined the rights of the affected individual under international law.106 The 
UNCESCR has previously maintained that if individuals/groups cannot enjoy the right to 
food via available means, affected states have to fulfil that right directly.107 Only those states 
able to demonstrate both an inability to carry out obligations unilaterally and unsuccessful 
efforts to obtain international support to ensure the availability and accessibility of the 
necessary food would avoid a finding of a violation of ICESCR terms.108 Arguably, by 
stressing the disaster-DIIHFWHGVWDWH¶VµGXW\WRVHHN¶DLG109 with presumptions of international 
support, there could be certain (albeit hesitant and obscure) implications regarding aid-offers.  
Similarly, the powerfully made arguments against a right to refuse aid, also assume the 
existence of externally-provided aid. Taken together, these arguments imply a duty of 
                                                                    
104 As regards needs and responses, see Valencia-Ospina 7KH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶VThird report on the 
protection of persons in the event of disasters, UN Doc. A/CN.4/629 0DUFK6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V
Third report) para 76. 
105 Despite weak enforcement of such proactive rights on the domestic level, notably in states which advocate 
duties of cooperation. 
106 Report on the work of the sixty-second session (n 49) para 318. 
107 GC12 (n 91) paras 6 and 15 respectively. 
108 GC12 (n 91) para 17.   
109 K Luopajärvi, µIs there an Obligation on States to Accept International Humanitarian Assistance to Internally 
'LVSODFHG3HUVRQVXQGHU,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ"¶(2003) 15 IJRL 678. 
external states (in particular) to offer assistance to stricken states, even if they do not imply 
an individualised right to humanitarian assistance.110  
6.3 Human rights duties of entities external to disasters 
$VQRWHGDOUHDG\FHUWDLQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQV¶PDQGDWHVPD\RUGDLQWKHPto 
act in disasters. Indeed there is potential for international responsibility when things go 
awry.111 Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur refers less to the human rights duties of 
external actors.  Undeniably, a human rights frame of reference, being classically state-
focussed, works easiest LQWKHFRQWH[WRIDVWDWH¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRLWVRZQSHRSOH.  
Nevertheless, the entities listed in draft article 16 may be said to constitute the building 
EORFNVRIWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶112 and the draft article itself implies notions of 
collective responsibility. If no offers of assistance emerged, would external actors bear 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\LIVXFKRPLVVLRQVXQGHUPLQHGVWULFNHQSRSXODWLRQV¶ULJKWVXQGHU
international law? This would effectively be a failure in due diligence. Such a consequence 
seems unlikely given the earlier mentioned 6L[WK&RPPLWWHH¶Vnegative response to the 
question of whether the general cooperative duty included a duty to provide assistance when 
requested by that state.113 In the ILC debates regarding draft article 2 it was clear that there 
was no proposal to expand existing human rights. Absent a specific right of individuals to 
directly enforce cooperation, the duty to cooperate is thus more of a horizontal inter-state 
duty.114 This fettering of the co-operative duty undoubtedly challenges the protective human 
rights ethos of the project and emphasises its imbalanced nature. However, as noted, this 
                                                                    
110 CL 6XQµ+XPDQLWDULDQ$VVLVWDQFHE\,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQLVDWLRQV$Question of Compulsory Access to 
9LFWLPV¶Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 320. 
111 See, e.g., Transnational Development Clinic of Yale Law School, Global Health Justice Partnership of the 
<DOH/DZ6FKRRODQGWKH<DOH6FKRRORI3XEOLF+HDOWKDQG$VVRFLDWLRQ+DLWÍHQQHGH'URLWGH/¶(QYLURQQPHQW
Peackeeping witKRXW$FFRXQWDELOLW\7KH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶5HVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKH+DLWLDQ&KROHUD(SLGHPLF
(2013) <http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics/Haiti_TDC_Final_Report.pdf > accessed 27 
September 2015; Georges et al. v. United Nations et al., 13-CV-7146 (JPO) (SDNY, 9 January 2015) (currently 
on appeal). 
112 A Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP, 2011). 
113 Report on the work of the sixty-fourth session (n 8) SDUD6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶VFifth Report (n 7) para 52. 
114 Zorzi Giustiniani (n 36) 70-1, 83. 
disinclination to re-understand the duty to co-operate was borne out of concerns regarding a 
possible duty to provide, rather than to offer assistance. A duty to offer would preserve the 
horizontal nature of the assistance-relationship and better retain a human rights focus for the 
project. 
6.4 Human rights as a value rather than a context 
The concept of human rights both describes the perilous context faced in disasters and 
represents a key value which informs the project RQµthe protection of persons in the event of 
GLVDVWHUV¶.115 Thus, the selective invocation of the concept would seem indefensible and 
unsustainable. The human rights dimension of the draft articles needs to be discarded or made 
rational. If it is accepted that the world requires mutualised responsibilities, and that 
international disaster-assistance is desirable and should be safeguarded, can legal 
opportunities arise from wider human rights law, a context within which the draft articles will 
operate? 
In fact, the idea of joint human rights responsibility is not new. Article 2(1) of the 
,&(6&5UHIHUVWRSDUWLHV¶REOLJDWLRQs to take steps at the international level to secure 
Covenant rights, with more specific co-operative obligations being mentioned in articles 11, 
15, 22 and 23, as well as in CESCR General Comments 2,116 7,117 and 15.118 In General 
Comment 14 concerning attainment of the highest standard of health,119 the UNCESR 
referred to tKHµjoinWDQGLQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ of states parties to cooperate in providing 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergencies.120 In particular, it stated that 
µ[e]ach State should contribute to this task to the maximum of its capacities¶ and went on to 
                                                                    
115 (emphasis added).   
116 CESCR, General Comment 2 regarding International technical assistance measures (Art 22 of the Covenant) 
UN Doc. E/1990/23 (2 February 1990). 
117 CESCR, General Comment 7 regarding the right to adequate housing (Art 11(1) of the Covenant) forced 
evictions, UN Doc. E/1998/22 (20 May 1997). 
118  CESCR, General Comment 15 regarding the right to water (Arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) UN 
Doc.E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003). 
119  Contained in International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR) art 12. 
120 GC14 (n 91) para 40. 
VSHFLI\WKDWµeconomically developed states have a special responsibility and interest to assist 
the poorer dHYHORSLQJVWDWHVLQWKLVUHJDUG¶.121 A special obligation is incumbent on those 
VWDWHVSDUWLHVDQGRWKHUDFWRUVµLQDSRVLWLRQWRDVVLVW¶WRSURYLGHµinternational assistance and 
cooperation, esSHFLDOO\HFRQRPLFDQGWHFKQLFDO¶ to enable developing countries to fulfil their 
core and other ICESCR obligations.122 This of course drew upon the earlier UNCESCR 
General Comment 3 and the 1978 Alma-Ata declaration. In General Comment 3 the 
UNCESCR had emphasised that available resources include those available internally and 
IURPWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶123 The 1978 Alma-Ata declaration challenged as 
µpolitically, socially and economically unacceptable¶DQGµof common concern to all 
FRXQWULHV¶,124 WKHµexisting gross inequality in the health status of the people particularly 
between developed and developing countries as well as within cRXQWULHV¶. The Special 
Rapporteur acknowledged Article 3(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development125 and 
a 2008 report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights126 which refers to cooperation 
both in the realisation of human rights by developing countries and a shared responsibility for 
their development. The 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility are very clear that states 
should not aid or assist in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. While there is 
no suggestion that the failure to offer or provide disaster aid is akin to one state supplying 
arms to another practising crimes against humanity, nevertheless there is a clear expectation 
of not acting so as to make bad situations worse. While some might flinch at the idea of a 
delictual-type responsibility for non-providing external states, there is already a body of law 
stressing shared responsibilities/obligation/duties. It is at least worth investigating whether a 
                                                                    
121 GC14 (n 91) para 40. 
122 GC14 (n 91) para 45. 
123 UNESCR, General Comment 3 regarding tKHQDWXUHRIVWDWHVSDUWLHV¶REOLJDWLRQV(Art 2, para 1 of the 
Covenant) UN Doc. E/1991/23 (14 December 1990) paras 10 and 13. 
124 See also Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (Art 56; and ICESCR 
Arts 12, 2(1), 22-3. 
125 Special 5DSSRUWHXU¶V)RXUWK5HSRUW (n 3) paras 36-8. 
126 Promotion And Protection Of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, 
 Including The Right To Development, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/10 (Note by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 15 August 2008). 
responsibility to mitigate loss (for example, starvation/the spreading of disease) indicates a 
duty to offer assistance. Recognising a duty to offer assistance would better reflect both 
existing law and the proclaimed ethos of international solidarity.   
6.5 The duty to offer assistance donate as a way of removing aid conditionality 
There is extensive analysis of the political context of aid-donation,127 notably of the 
(dubious) conditionality which often attaches to relief. Obviously there are illegal conditions 
(such as discrimination in aid distribution128), however, other problematic conditions can be 
sought, such as a commitment to cooperate on criminal matters or to democratise non-
democracies. 7KH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶VWKLUGUHSRUWRVWHQVLEO\UHMHFWHGDQy ethos of µnew 
humanitarianism¶129 while draft article 7¶V stressing of the principle of humanity,130 taken 
together with impartiality, indicated a qualitative question with the key distinguishing criteria 
for assistance being need.131 International actors were cautioned against µcommitting acts 
which might constitute interference in the internal affairs of the domestic State, so as to 
ensure an adequate and effective response¶.132 Impartiality133 acts as an umbrella for the three 
criteria of non-discrimination, proportionality and neutrality per se. If the ILC project favours 
needs-based assistance and rejects self-conscious, politicised refusal of aid, then a right to 
                                                                    
127 M Tan-Mullins, J Rigg, L Law, and C Grundy-Warr, µRe-mapping the politics of aid: the changing 
structures and networks of humanitarian assistance in post-WVXQDPL7KDLODQG¶(2007) 7 Progress in 
Development Studies 327. 
128 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States), ICJ Rep 1986 (27 June 1986) 14 paras 242-3. See also Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of 
Emergency Assistance (adopted 18 June 1984) art 1(a); and the landmark Code of Conduct for the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, Resolutions of the 26th International 
Conference of the Red &URVVDQG5HG&UHVFHQW*HQHYD$QQH[9,.%HHFNPDQµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Response to Non-armed Conflict Disasters: legal challenges encountered in light of the current regulatory 
IUDPHZRUN¶Refugee Survey Quarterly 129, 132. See also Annotations to the IDRL Guidelines (n 17) 
s 4(2). 
129 6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶V7KLUG5HSRUWQ 
130 Draft art 7.  
131 Report on the work of the sixty-second VHVVLRQQSDUD6HHDOVR)LRQD)R[µ1HZ+XPDQLWDULanism: 
Does it provide a moral banner for the 21st FHQWXU\"¶'LVDVWHUV-8. 
132 Report on the work of the sixty-second VHVVLRQQSDUD6HHDOVR$OH['H:DDOµ7KHKXPDQLWDULDQV¶
tUDJHG\HVFDSDEOHDQGLQHVFDSDEOHFUXHOWLHV¶Disasters (2010) 34 130, 135. 
133 ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3054th meeting, UN Doc.A/CN.4/SR.3054 (26 November 2010) 
(Provisional summary record of the 3054th meeting) 18-19. 
offer aid should be expressed in bolder, more obligatory or dutiful terms. If neutrality134 is 
µthe operational mechanism to implement the ideal of humanity¶,135 a duty to offer aid could 
circumvent murky politics, guarantee aid-neutrality and complement the trope of apoliticism 
stressed in draft article 7.136 
7. Guarding against donor unilateralism and protecting the primacy of the 
affected state 
A duty to offer assistance to those in need and in times of stress, is intuitively 
attractive. However, it could strengthen perceptions of a resource-rich West/North and a 
weak Global South which can only ever be the recipient of charity. Such a duty would also 
not necessarily or inevitably be an unalloyed good if it had the potential to further weaken 
disaster-affected states. Unilateral action, particularly by third states, remains unacceptable.  
This section considers the dangers of a potential duty to offer assistance and whether they 
might be more illusory than real given the terms of the other draft articles.   
Although the DUDIW$UWLFOHVSURPRWHGXWLHVRIFRRSHUDWLRQDQGIHWWHUDIIHFWHGVWDWHV¶
rights to refuse aid, they do not divest stricken states of sovereignty. A certain threshold of 
harm must be reached both to trigger aid and to guard against unwarranted interventions.  
Draft Article 3 defines disasters, and its commentaries refer to existing legal caveats stressing 
certain requirements137 including an exceptional scale of damage and societal disruption.138  
Temporary emergencies which stretch, but do not disable, a state are probably insufficient.139   
By stressing the primacy, but only the primacy, of an affected state, draft article 12 
perhaps suggests that there exists an alternative option of non-consensual, external, 
                                                                    
134 Report on the work of the sixty-second session (n 49) para 311; See also the First Geneva Convention (n 42). 
135 Provisional summary record of the 3154th meeting (n 135) 18. 
136 Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 104, para 4.  
137 Bruges Resolution (n 1) art I(2). 
138 1993 Ethiopian National Policy (n 17) s II.1. See also the Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of 
Emergency Assistance (n 130), and the Caribbean Association Agreement (n 27) art 1(1). 
139 SpeciaO5DSSRUWHXU¶V)RXUWK5HSRUW (n 3) para 9, but interestingly there is no apparent requirement for human 
harm or transboundary damage, see Z Giustiniani (n 36) 68 citing the Report on the work of the sixty-second 
session (n 49) 11. 
international intervention.140 Draft article 14 alludes to the potentially non-consensual 
provision of international assistance in the event of an DIIHFWHGVWDWH¶V arbitrary refusal, 
raising concerns regarding safeguarding against undesirable unilateralism.141 Both of these 
concerns can be allayed. First, any re-drafting of draft article 12 so as to imply the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VULJKW (or secondary duty) as a whole to intervene in a non-
consenting affected territory, was strongly opposed.142 Thus, if draft article 16 articulated a 
duty to offer assistance, draft article 12 should militate against its improper invocation. As 
regards draft article 14, this danger relates more to a potential duty to provide aid/assistance, 
rather than one to offer it. The perils for disaster-affected states RIµRSHQGRRU¶SROLFLHVIRU
foreign actors are well-known: supply-driven thinking, non-professional relief workers and 
the blocking of appropriate aid.143 Draft Article 15 recognises that affected states may place 
conditions on the provision of external assistance144 taking into account the identified needs 
of stricken persons and the quality of the assistance (in line with draft Article 14145). $µGXW\
WRRIIHU¶DOORZVIRUDSURFHVVRIRIfer-and-(potentially qualified)-DFFHSWDQFHZKLFKDµGXW\WR
SURYLGH¶FDQQRW7KHIRUPHUDOVRbetter balances relationships between assisting and affected 
states. 
,QWHUPVRIRSHUDWLRQDOLVLQJDGXW\WRRIIHUDVVLVWDQFHIROORZLQJDGLVDVWHU¶VDFWXDO
occurrence, external actors could make clear what their offers entail. It is, however, important 
to avoid a potential bureaucratic quagmire. Given that many disaster relief arrangements are 
                                                                    
140 See statements by Ms Jacobsson and and Mr Vasciannie in Provisional summary record of the 3057th 
meeting, UN Doc.A/CN.4/SR.3057 (1 July 2010) (Provisional summary record of the 3057th meeting) 4-5; and 
references to the Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory 
Opinion) ICJ Rep 1962 (20 July 1962) 151. 
141 Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18).  
142 See statement by Mr. Vascianne in Provisional summary record of the 3139th meeting (n 142) 5. No 
UHIHUHQFHVWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VVHFRQGDU\UHVSRQVLELOLW\ZHUHLQFOXGHGQRUZDVDµwithout 
SUHMXGLFH¶FODXVHLQVHUWHGUHJDUGLQJWKHULJKWVRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\WRSURYLGHODZIXOKXPDQLWDULDQ
assistance to stricken persons, in the event of state failure. 
143 Beeckman (n 130) 133-6HHDOVR1.OHLQµ,QWKHZDNHRIFDWDVWURSKHFRPHVWKHZKLIIRIXQUHVW¶The 
Guardian (6 May 2008). 
144 Provided they accord with good faith, sovereignty and humanitarian principles per draft art 7. 
145 Report on the work of the sixty-sixth session (n 18) 123. 
dealt with regionally, draft aUWLFOH¶VWHUPVUHJDUGLQJFRRSHUDWLRQDQGGUaft aUWLFOH¶VGXW\
WRFRRSHUDWHLQGLVDVWHUULVNUHGXFWLRQFRXOGSHUKDSVSURGXFHDµVWDQGLQJDUUDQJHPHQW¶
regarding the types of assistance likely to be offered by neighbouring states either 
individually, or those to be filtered through a regional organisation. Injecting a preparatory 
dimension into a draft article 16 duty could mitigate any unwelcome assistance-deluge. 
If the standing arrangement proposal is rejected or non-existent, requiring a call from 
stricken states, to indicate timing and type of assistance required, would allow them to 
exercise their µPDUJLQRIDSSUHFLDWLRQ¶146 (although admittedly this assumes a still-
functioning state apparatus).  However, could draft aUWLFOH¶V µGXW\WRVHHN¶DVVLVWDQFH147 
equate to a request, or bypass such a requirement? This is unlikely. The drafters specifically 
UHMHFWHGXVHRIWKHZRUGµUHTXHVW¶7RµVHHN¶DVVLVWDQFHLPSOLHGDEURDGµQHJRWLDWHGDSSURDFK¶
and process, meaning that affected states did not have to seek assistance from every source 
detailed,148 nor was automatic consent to any offers implied following a call for help.  
1RWDEO\µUHTXHVW¶WHQGVWREHXVHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIPXWXDODVVLVWDQFHDQGEHWZHHQWUHDW\
parties where there is more trust.149 Thus, draft aUWLFOH¶Vinherent limitations mean that any 
potential right/duty to offer aid does not render an open season on stricken states and 
provides reassurance that any potential duty to offer assistance should not eliminate the 
capacity of stricken states to refuse aid.150   
8. Conclusion 
During the ILC deliberations on the right to offer assistance, Mr Saboia, noted 
SDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQWKHSURMHFW¶VUDWLRQDOHWKDWdisasters are matters of international concern and 
the international interest in human rights protection. As well as this project being an 
                                                                    
146 See n 104 and associated text and the commentary to draft article 12, Report on the work of the sixty-sixth 
session (n 18). 
147 See also Bruges Resolution (n 1) art III, para 3.  
148 6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU¶VFourth Report (n 3) para 44. 
149 See Tampere Convention (n 19) art 4; 2005 ASEAN Agreement (n 20) arts 3-4. 
150 )RUGLVFXVVLRQVHH71HOVRQµ5HMHFWLQJWKHJLIWKRUVHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFVRIGLVDVWHUDLGUHIXVDO¶
Conflict Security & Development 379. 
expUHVVLRQRIVROLGDULW\LWFRXOGDOVREHUHDGDVRQHRIµHQOLJKWHQHGVHOI-LQWHUHVW¶151 His 
WKRXJKWVUHFDOO-XGJH-HQQLQJV¶comments that an assisting state simultaneously defends itself 
when it defends another because there is an inter-mingling of the security of all.152 By 
analogy, there is no telling when a state will be stricken by natural disaster and will need 
assistance. Further, a state weakened by natural disaster can be a breeding ground for 
numerous long-term threats that menace both internally and externally. While certain  states 
in the Global South are often stricken, it is worth remembering that Hurricane Katrina and the 
Japanese tsunami and earthquake of 2010 occurred in highly developed, mature, market 
economies and international aid was still desperately needed.   
A duty to offer assistance would lend a concreteness to the material edge of 
international solidarity. It would also complement the limited capacity to refuse aid as 
proclaimed by the ILC Draft Articles. If it is the case that in extremis politics should be 
suspended and humanitarianism should come to the fore, how can a duty to offer assistance, a 
duty of solidarity, be denied?  Draft article 16 should not embody a right to do nothing. 
                                                                    
151 Provisional summary record of the 3102nd meeting (n 55) 9.  
152 Nicaragua (n 130) para 545. 
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